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Abstract
This article tackles the feature of optimal public policy such as the level of en-
forcement and the supply of public goods in an economy characterized by a huge
informal sector. We consider informality as the group of productive activities which,
before hand, do not comply (totally or partially) with government regulations. The
Government intervenes as a Stackelberg leader and has to decide how to allocate pub-
lic expenditures, collected through the tax system, between the provision of a public
good, which can only be used for formal activties, and enforcement e¤ort, aimed at
detecting informal rms that evade taxes. Taking the public policy as given, a rep-
resentative family, owner of a representative rm, decides how to split a x amount
of labour supply between formal and informal activities. Our results show that the
greater are the distortions in the process of tax collection, the larger is the size of
the informal sector. Finally, we derive the properties of the optimal public policy.
In particular, we show that the shadow cost of public fund represent the rationale of
enforcement spending. We also point out that the size of the tax distortion (e.g. the
shadow cost of public funds) is inversely related to total income, the tax rate and the
provision of the public good. Our calibration results reveal that higher values of the
shadow cost of public funds call for more stick (more enforcement) and less carrot
(public goods).
Keywords: Informality, public good and enforcement.
JEL codes: K10, K20, K42, O17.
We are extremely grateful to Nicolás Idrobo for his excellent research assistance.
yCorresponding author: Associate Profesor at the University of Los Andes (Bogota) and Visiting Fellow
at Toulouse School of Economics. Email: d.bardey@uniandes.edu.co
zDepartment of Economics, Universidad de los Andes. E-mail: dmejia@uniandes.edu.co. Director of
Cesed.
1
1. Introduction
The size of the informal sector in many developing economies, as measured by Schneider
(2005), is close to 40%, especially in many Latin American countries.1 What is more
worrying is that in the medium term, informality levels are on the rise in many developing
economies. According to Perry et al. (2007) informality levels in most Latin American
countries increased between the late 1980s and the begining of 2000s. Most measures
of informality analyzed in Perry et al. (2007)2 show a signicant increase in informality
levels in most Latin American countries. As pointed out in La Porta and Shleifer (2014),
the informal sector has extremely low productivity compared to the formal economy since
informal rms tend to be smaller and ine¢ cient.
The model we propose in this article builds on Mejía and Posada (2011). In particular,
we consider informality as the group of productive activities which, ex-ante, do not comply
with government regulations. This non compliance with government regulations can take
place in di¤erent dimensions of economic activity such as tax evasion, non compliance with
social security payments, minimum wages, sanitary and environmental regulations, etc.
Furthermore, non compliance with norms or regulations may be partial or total.3 One of
the most salient costs of being informal is the lack of access to some governement-provided
services such as access to the judicial system to resolve contract-related disputes or the
imposibility of participating in public trainning programs. Therefore, at the individual
level, the decision to become informal can be viewed as a rational response to the system of
incentives at work generated by government regulations and the provision of some public
goods that can only be accessed if the rm or the individual fully comply with government
regulations. In particular, rms might decide to become informal if the tax rate becomes
too high for formal activities to be protable (relative to informal activities where taxes
can be partially or totally evaded). Nevertheless, although individual decisions might be
optimal, this collective action problem may generate aggregate ine¢ ciencies (Loayza, 2007).
In this article, we develop a model in which a representative individual (or household)
1According to La Porta and Shleifer (2014), in the poorest countries it is about 50%.
2Percentage of employed workers, percentage of salaried workers, percentage of the labor force that
lacks pensions and percentage of self employed, among others.
3We focus on the informal sector and do not consider the so-called underground economy. Namely,
while the latter can be characterized as a violation to the penal code, the former is not. In particular,
tax avoidance in many countries or the violation of environmental laws is not necessarily investigated and
punished by the penal system.
decides the amount of time she allocates to operate in a formal rm (or technology) and in
an informal rm. On the one hand, by working with the formal technology, the individual
can take advantage of a public good in the production process but has to pay taxes. On
the other, the individual may decide to operate with the informal rm but cannot take
advantage of the public good in the production process.4 Additionally, the rm can be
detected evading taxes with a probability that is increasing in the level of government
enforcement and on the size of the informal rms activities.5 In case of being detected,
the informal rm has to pay the evaded taxes plus a ne of a given size.
We consider a non paternalistic government which maximizes the representative house-
holds welfare.6 We assume that the State plays as a Stackelberg leader and decides how
to allocate public expenditures, collected through the tax system, between the provision of
a public good (which can only be used by the rms operating in the formal sector7) and
enforcement activities, aimed at detecting the informal rm evading taxes. When deciding
the optimal provision of the public good and the enforcement level, the government takes
into account how the representative family reacts to these decisions. In such a context and
taking into account the shadow cost of public fund, we characterize the optimal stick and
carrot policy.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it contributes to the growing literature
on informality by providing a new view where the size of the informal sector is endogenously
determined by the interaction between the government and individual decisions. While
Cerda and Saravia (2013) focus on (heterogenous) rms decision to allocate time and
factors between both sectors, we rather consider that this decision comes from workers and
thus is taken by a representative consumer.8 In this respect, we characterize the structural
4We assume that the public good is not a pure public good in the sense that the government can partially
or totally exclude informal rms from using it. Thus, we are formally refering to a club good.
5This assumption allows us to capture the famous concept that "small is beautiful". The available
evidence does show a clear negative relationship between rm size and informality levels (see Perry et al.,
2007).
6The debate concerning the States objective in the presence of an informal sector (where a norm is
partially or totally violated) is quite complex. It might seem natural to assume that the States objective
is to maximize formal production and disincentive informal production (see for instance Mejia and Posada
[2011] for a positive analysis using this assumption). However, it can also be realistic to think about a
less paternalistic State that simply maximizes the representative households utility. For instance, this
assumption may reect a democratic political system in which the government has been elected in function
of the majoritys preferences in terms of enforcement.
7In this sense this is not a pure public good as it is possible to exclude users.
8Another di¤erence is that their model is intensive and extensive while we focus on an intensive approach.
parameters that determine the size of the informal sector. We particularly point out the link
between the size of the informal sector and the shadow cost of public funds. This theoretical
result is in line with the empirical evidence presented in Auriol and Walters (2006). Indeed,
we show that the greater are these distortions, the larger is the size of the informal sector.
This result is also consistent with Adaman and Mumcus (2010) ndings. In a global game
framework, they show that ine¢ ciencies and the low level of trustworthiness of the public
sector induces an equilibrium with high levels of informality (see also Torgler and Schneider
[2009] for empirical evidence). In spite of the fact that the State cannot observe the level
of informal production, it is optimal to spend all the budget in public goods and nothing in
enforcement activities as long as there is no shadow cost of public funds. Roughly speaking,
our model reveals that the shadow cost of public funds constitutes the rationale for spending
in enforcement activities. Using the calibration results we show that when the State cannot
observe informal activities, it has to spend more in public goods and enforcement to obtain
the same size of the formal sector. More precisely, our calibration results reveal that higher
values of the shadow cost of public funds call for more stick (more enforcement) and less
carrot (public goods).
Additionaly to the previous works already quoted, our paper is related to and borrows
from a number of stands of the literature. Cremer and Gahvari (1994) determines the
optimal tax design in the presence of tax evasion. They provide su¢ cient conditions under
which tax evasion decreases the optimal tax rate, while showing that an increase in the
optimal tax rate is also possible. Boadway et al. (2009) resumes this issue but considering
explicitly the presence of an informal sector. As in our paper, the size of the informal
sector is endogenous and mainly determined by State policies. Nevertheless, Cremer and
Gavhari (1994) and Boadway et al. (2009) focus on optimal taxation issues, while our
analysis is devoted to the optimal public policy analysis subject to a balanced budget
constraint (e.g., the choice between the carrots - the public good provision - and the
sticks - enforcement activities). Besfamille et al. (2009) analyze the relation between tax
enforcement, aggregate output and government revenue when imperfectly competitive rms
evade a specic output tax. They reveal that aggregate output decreases with the level
of tax enforcement. Government revenue increases with enforcement when the tax rate
is low but, when the tax rate is high, government revenue is either inversely U-shaped or
decreasing in the level enforcement. In line with Besfamille et al. (2009), our paper analyzes
the relationship between the tax level, enforcement and government revenue. We point out
that the size of the tax distortion (e.g. the shadow cost of public funds) is inversely related
to the size of the formal sector, total income, the optimal tax rate and the optimal provision
of the publicgood; and, is positively related to the size of the informal sector and optimal
enforcement activities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the set-up. Section
3 characterizes the optimal public policy in various contexts. First, we solve the central
planner problem when he is able to choose the time devoted by the representative family in
both sectors. Next, we consider the decentralized model with tax distortions. In order to
disentangle the e¤ects of some policy variables on variables such as the size of the informal
sector, optimal enforcement and the provision of the public good, we calibrate the rst
and second best cases using plausible parameter values. The results from the calibration
excersise are presented at the end of Section 3. The last section presents some concluding
remarks.
2. The model
The production of the nal good in the formal sector, yf , depends on the amount of
labor allocated by the representative household to this sector, lf ; and on a public good,
b, produced by the State. The production function in the formal sector is described by
yf = f(lf ; b): Naturally, we assume that the formal sector is characterized by positive and
decreasing returns to each input: flf ; fb > 0 and flf lf ; fbb  0. Additionally, we assume
that formal labor and the public good are complementary in the production of the nal
good, that is, that flf b > 0: Alternatively, the nal good can be produced in the informal
sector, i.e. yi = g(li), with gli > 0 and glili  0. We consider that there is no positive
externality from the formal to the informal sector.9
We note p(li; e) the probability that the State detects the informal rm evading taxes.
This probability depends on the size of the informal rm li and on the States allocation
of resources to enforcement activities e. We assume pe > 0; pee  0; pli > 0, and plili  0.
In words, the probability that an informal rm is detected evading taxes is increasing in
the States enforcement e¤orts, but with decreasing returns. The probability of detection
9In the informality literature, the expression public good is often used. Nevertheless, in our framework,
as long as the the informal sector cannot benet from the public good, stricly speaking, we should refer to b
as a club good. Actually, it is the relative advantage generated by the public good between the two sectors
and not the absolute that is relevant for the representative household´s optimal allocation decisions. As the
benet generated by the public good in the formal sector is endogenous, the assumption of no externality
to the informal sector is not restrictive.
is increasing and convex in the size of the informal rm. We also assume that p(:) satises
the following Inada condition: @p(0; li)=@e = +1. Furthermore, we consider that peli  0,
which means that the marginal e¤ect of enforcement on the probability of detection is
increasing in the size of the informal rm (the level of enforcement).
We assume that the cost to an informal rm of being detected evading taxes consists
of a ne of size g(li). This ne may be interpreted as the opportunity cost of not being
able to produced if the rm is closed down for a certain amount of time or as a pure
ne that the rm has to pay if it is detected.10 The representative household takes the
strategic variables of the State (tax rate, enforcement, and public good provision) as given.
We consider that the households total labor supply, Ls, is exogenously given. Then, the
households decision consists only in allocating the total labor supply between the formal
and the informal sector in order to maximize his expected income. The problem faced by
the representative household can be written as:
max
flf ;lig
(1  )f(lf ; b) + g(li)  p(e; li)g(li); (1)
s.t Ls = lf + li; (2)
where (1   )f(lf ; b) represents the net income (after tax) earned in the formal sector,
while g(li) denotes the income earned in the informal sector. These income levels must be
reduced by p(e; li)g(li), the expected cost of the ne if li > 0.
The optimal allocation of labor between the formal and the informal sector is given
by11:
gli(li) (1  p(e; li))  pli(e; li)g(li) = (1  )flf (lf ; b): (3)
The households optimal allocation of labor between the formal and the informal sector is
such that the expected net marginal benet from allocating an extra unit of time to the
informal sector is equal to its net marginal benet in the formal sector. On the one hand,
the marginal benet from allocating an extra unit of time to the informal sector (the left
hand side of equation 3) is given by the marginal productivity in the informal sector gli(li)
times (1  p(e; li)), minus the marginal increase in the probability of being detected, pli ,
times the size of the ne that has to be paid if the rm is detected, g(li). On the other
10In this paper, since we consider a risk-neutral representative household, we do not focus on the trade-o¤
between enforcement e¤ort and the size of the ne. Finally, we consider that the ne takes a nite value
due to a limited liability argument. Otherwise, the solution would be straightforward and would have
followed an argument a la Becker: the ne would be equal to innity.
11We adopt an intensive approach and thus focus our attention on interior solution.
hand, the net marginal benet from allocating an extra unit of time to the formal sector
(right hand side of equation 3) is simply composed of the marginal productivity of labor in
the formal sector net of taxes, (1  )flf .
Remark 1. All other things equal, the level of production in the formal sector increases
with the level of provision of public goods and enforcement activities.
Proof. Applying the implicit function theorem directly gives the result.
A higher provision of the public good makes it relatively more attractive, ceteris paribus,
to allocate time to the formal sector because labor and the public good are complementary
in the production process. As the amount of enforcement e¤orts increases, the incentive
to allocate time to the informal sector decreases because the probability of being caught
evading taxes and having to pay the ne increases. Therefore, both instruments work into
the same direction and allow the State to reduce the size of the informal sector.
3. The optimal public policy
In this section we distinguish between several cases. We start with a rst-best analy-
sis where the State acts as a Central Planner and can directly choose the representative
households labor supply between the formal and informal sectors, lf and li respectively. In
the second-best allocation, we consider the situation in which the State cannot choose or
impose the household labor supply between the two sectors. Nevertheless, it still behaves
as a Stackelberg leader in the sense that it chooses the vector (b; e; ) taking into account
the optimal reaction of the representative household to its choices.
3.1. First-best analysis
In a rst-best analysis, the State can directly choose the households allocation of time
between the formal and the informal sector. In such a context, enforcement activities, as
captured by e, should be interpreted as the cost generated by the burden of the proof. The
States objective is the maximization of the households utility, that is:
max
flf ;b;eg
W FB = (1  )f(lf ; b) + g(Ls   lf )
 
1  p(e; Ls   lf )

; (4)
subject to the following budget constraint:
(1  )f(lf ; b) + p(e; Ls   lf )g(Ls   lf )  b+ e: (5)
The budget constraint says that the tax collected plus the ne earned through the
detection process is equal to the sum of the expenditures in the public good and detection
e¤orts. Following La¤ont and Tirole (1993), an easy way to capture these distortions is
to consider that for each unit of tax collected, a proportion  is lost.12 Because a fraction
 of the taxes collected is lost, the rst term in the left hand side of the States budget
constraint is scaled down by a fraction 1 . As the tax and the detection e¤orts intervene
negatively in the objective function, it is straightforward that the budget constraint is
binding. Therefore, we write the tax rate  that ensures that the budget constraint holds
with equality as:
 =
b+ e  p(e; Ls   lf )g(Ls   lf )
(1  ) f(lf ; b) : (6)
Replacing (6) in the States objective function, the States program becomes:
max
flf ;b;eg
W FB = f(lf ; b) + g(Ls   lf )  b+ e
1   +

1  p(e;
Ls   lf )g(Ls   lf ): (7)
The objective function is then composed of the sum of the production in both sectors,
minus the States expenditures in enforcement and the public good (b + e), scaled down
by a fraction 1  . Additionally, the ne collected p(e; Ls   lf )g(Ls   lf ) must be added
as it relaxes the budget constraint. It is worth noticing that the expected ne collected,
p(e; Ls   lf )g(Ls   lf ); is multiplied by  because for each 1$ coming from the ne (e.g.,
not coming from tax distortions), $ is saved. In the rst-best scenario, in addition to
maximize the welfare function with respect to its policy instruments b and e, the State is
able to chose the amount of labor supply in the formal sector (lf). Moreover, since the tax
rate is dened by the budget constraint, it is equivalent to maximize with respect to  or
one of these instruments, i.e. b and e.
Proposition 1. The rst-best allocation is characterized by:
i)
@f(Ls lf ;b)
@lf
  @g(Ls l

f )
@lf
= 
1 

@p(e;Ls lf )
@lf
g(Ls   lf ) +
@g(Ls lf )
@lf
p(e; Ls   lf )

;
ii)
@f(Ls lf ;b)
@b
= 1
1  ;
iii)
@p(e;Ls lf )
@e
g(Ls   lf ) = 1  :
Condition (i) is an e¢ ciency condition: if the State is able to choose the households
allocation of time between the formal and the informal sectors on the one hand, and there
is no tax distortions on the other, i.e.  = 0, it would choose an allocation such that
12In some extent, 1   captures the tax system quality: when 1$ is collected through tax,  is lost.
the marginal productivity of labor is the same in both sectors. Moreover, this condition
reveals that, for a given level of provision of the public good, the States optimal allocation
of labor to the formal sector decreases with the presence of tax distortions. Because taxes
create distortions and the nes collected constitute an alternative source of revenue, the
State is more lenient on informality compared to the case of no distortions. Condition (ii)
says that the State chooses the optimal provision of the public good in such a way that
the marginal productivity of the public good is equal to the marginal cost of providing it,
weighted by the size of the tax distortion. All other things equal, for higher values of ,
the spending on the public good becomes lower. The third condition (iii) points out that
even in the case where the State can impose the households allocation of time between
the formal and the informal sector, it allocates positive levels of resources to enforcement
in order to increase the probability of detecting informal rms and, thus, increase revenue
without tax distortions. Moreover, as the probability of detection is increasing and concave
in e, the optimal level of enforcement is increasing in the tax distortion . Obviously, it
also increases with the ne rate, .
Let us now dene the following marginal rate of substitution between enforcement and
public good provision:
MRSe=lf =
@p(e;Ls lf)
@lf
g(Ls   lf ) + @g(Ls lf )@lf p(e; Ls   lf )
@p(e;Ls lf)
@e
g(Ls   lf )
:
This marginal rate of substitution tells us about the trade-o¤ the State faces when choosing
lf and e. For a given level of nes collected, the State can choose to increase the level of
enforcement g(Ls   lf )
 
@p(e; Ls   lf )=@e

or it can increase the level of informality li. In
this case, there are two e¤ects at work. First, for a given level of informal production,
g(Ls   lf ), it marginally increases the probability of detection @p(e; Ls   lf )=@lf . Second,
for a given level of detection of informal rms, it marginally increases the size of the ne
collected @g(Ls   lf )=@lf .
Finally, combining the three rst order conditions, we obtain:
Remark 2.
@f (lf ; b)
@lf
 
@g(li)
@li
@f (lf ; b)
@b
= (1  )MRSe=lf (e; lf ):
To understand the previous equality, consider the following function:
 (lf ; b) =
@f (lf ; b)
@lf
  @g(li)
@li
:
It is worth noticing that with  equal to 0, we have  (lf ; b
) = 0, which can be considered
as a "pure" e¢ ciency condition. The term "pure" refers to the fact that in such a case, the
time devoted to each sector is chosen to equate their marginal productivities. Technically,
it comes from the fact that e = 0; implying that @p(e = 0; li )=@e ! +1 and therefore
MRSe=lf (e; lf ) = 0. In words, it means that the presence of tax distortions obliges the
State to alter the "pure" e¢ ciency condition. These distortions depend on the marginal
rate of substitution between the size of the informal sector and the level of enforcement
e¤orts. This marginal rate of substitution is informative about how much the State needs
to increase its spending in enforcement to outweigh a reduction of the size of the informal
sector in order to keep the expected ne constant.
To sum-up, in the presence of tax distortions, the State may optimally tolerate a larger
level of informality in order to reduce the negative impact of distortions on the States
revenues. On the one hand, more informality is associated to less expenditures in the public
good, reducing the e¤ect of tax distortions. On the other hand, because the probability
of detection is increasing in the size of the informal rm, more informality implies more
nes collected by the State and still less tax distortions. These results are resumed in the
following corollary:
Corollary 2. The presence of tax distortions in developing countries may provide a ra-
tionalefor a relatively large informal sector.
This remark is consistent with the estimations provided in Auriol and Walters (2006)
for African developing countries. Indeed, applying the standard Devarajan et als 1-2-
3 model13 to a data base of 38 countries, these authors reveal that there is a strong
positive relationship between the marginal cost of public funds and the informality levels
for the countries in their sample. Our rst-best allocation results allow us to provide an
explanation to this evidence. In spite of the fact that we consider that the State can choose
the households allocation of time between the formal and the informal sectors, it may
be optimal for the State to tolerate a larger informal sector in the presence of higher tax
distortions. The shadow cost of public funds may constitute a piece of the puzzle that
explains the so-called broken contractbetween the State and the citizens in developing
countries that are characterized by high levels of informality (see Perry et al., 2007).
13Devarajan et al. (1994).
3.2. Second-best analysis
In the second-best analysis, we consider a decentralized economy in which the State cannot
choose the households allocation of labor between the formal and the informal sectors.
However, we assume that the State is a Stackelberg leader and chooses the optimal allo-
cation of tax revenues between the provision of the public good and enforcement e¤orts,
taking into account the households reaction to these choices.
The second-best analysis is organized in three parts. First, we analyze the reaction
function of the representative household. The second part is devoted to the normative issue
in which the States program consists in choosing the allocation of public funds between
enforcement activities and the provision of the public good. The third part provides a
calibration exercise which sheds light on the interplay between policy variables and other
endogenous variables of the model.
3.2.1. Optimal public policy with tax distortions and non-observable informality
In this case, the State objective is:
max
fb;eg
W SB = f(l^f ; b) + g(Ls   l^f ) + 
1  p(e;
Ls   l^f )g(Ls   l^f )  1
1  (b+ e) (8)
where, l^f (e;  ; b) is implicitly determined by the following households reaction function:
gli(li) (1  p(e; li))  pli(e; li)g(li) = (1  )flf (l^f ; b):
The rst order conditions are:
@f(:)
@b
  1
1   =  
"
@f(:)
@l^f (:)
  @g(:)
@l^f (:)
  
1  
 
@p(:)
@l^f (:)
g(li) +
@g(:)
@l^f (:)
p(e; li)
!#
@l^f (:)
@b
and,
@p(:)
@e
g(li)  1
1   =  
"
@f(:)
@l^f (:)
  @g(:)
@l^f (:)
  
1  
 
@p(:)
@l^f (:)
g(li) +
@g(:)
@l^f (:)
p(e; li)
!#
@l^f (:)
@e
:
In order to understand some features of the optimal policy, consider rst that the State
wants to implement the same level of formality (resp. informality) in the rst-best as that
obtained in the second-best (e.g. lf = l

f ). In this case, we have:
Lemma 3. If lf = l

f , then the optimal public policy consists of e
 > e and b > b.
Proof. See the appendix.
Lemma 3 says that, in order to implement the same level of formality as in the rst-best,
the State has to spend more resources in both, the public good provision and enforcement,
i.e. in b and e respectively. It is due to the fact that as pointed out in Remark 3, the levels
of formal activities decided by the household increases in b and e.
Let us consider the case where  = 0.
Remark 3. For  = 0, we have e = 0.
This remark points out that if taxes do not generate distortions, the State still prefers
to spend all its budget in the public good and nothing in enforcement activities. This result
comes from the same mechanism at work that was revealed in Proposition 1 and Remark
1. It says that spending in the public good is a su¢ cient instrument in the absence of
tax distortions to maximize the representative households welfare. Conversely, the shadow
cost of public funds constitutes the rationale behind the States investment in enforcement
activities. From the States perspective, all other things being equal, it becomes more
protable to spend in enforcement activities when  increases. Indeed, in the second-best,
the rst-order condition in e implies that the term 1  (@p=@e) is negative, which means
that the marginal cost of enforcement activities is lower than its marginal benet, inducing
the State to spend a positive amount of resources on enforcement activities.
Rearranging the rst order conditions gives:
@l^f (:)
@b
=

1
1    
@f(:)
@b

"
@f(:)
@l^f (:)
+
@g(:)
@l^f (:)
+

1  
@p(:)
@l^f (:)

# ; (9)
@l^f (:)
@e
=

1
1    

1  
@p(:)
@e


"
@f(:)
@l^f (:)
+
@g(:)
@l^f (:)
+

1  
@p(:)
@l^f (:)

# : (10)
Combining the last two conditions leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 4. In the presence of distorsive taxes and incentives problem, the optimal
public policy follows:
@l^f (:)
@b
@l^f (:)
@e
=
1
1    
@f(:)
@b
1
1    

1  
@p(:)
@e

: (11)
In order to understand Proposition 4, let us rst focus on the case when  = 0. The
previous condition becomes:
@f(:)
@b
= 1 MRSe=b:
We can easily recognize the equality obtained in the rst best case between the marginal
productivity of the public good in the formal sector and its marginal cost. Nevertheless,
this equality is distorted by the marginal rate of substitution between e and b. Indeed, as
long as the State cannot choose directly the level of informality, it has to set the amounts e
and b taking into account their relative impact on the size of the formal (resp. informal)
sectors.
It is more tedious to disentangle the e¤ects of  and the no observability issues arising
from the condition given in Proposition 4. In the following section we calibrate the model
in order to highlight these two combining e¤ects on l^f , b and e.
3.3. Calibration of the model and results
In order to asses how changes in some of the structural parameters of the model a¤ect
equilibrium choices, we proceed by calibrating the model using functional forms that satisfy
the assumptions made througout the paper. In the appendix, we present the equations used
in the calibration of the model. The functional forms that we use in this calibration exercise
are:14
f (lf ; b) = l

f b
 ; g(li) = li; p(e; li) = e
li; (12)
with : ;  ;  2 (0; 1); and  > 0: (13)
According to these functional forms,  and  represent the relative importance of labor
and the public good in production in the formal sector.15 We assume, without loss of
generality, that informal production is a linear function of the amount of informal labor,
with a productivity captured by the parameter .16 Finally, the probability that an informal
rm is detected evading taxes is an increasing and concave function of the governments
14It is straightforward to show that these functional forms satisfy all assumptions made throughout the
paper.
15We assume that +   1:
16Behind the assumption that labor has decreasing returns to scale in the formal sector and linear in the
informal sector lies the (not modeled here) potential use of a xed amount of physical capital in the formal
sector that induces decreasing returns to the allocation of labor to this sector.
enforcement e¤orts, e, and a linear function of the size of the informal sector, as captured
by li.
In order to check the robustness and stability of the calibration results, we conduct
10,000 Montecarlo calibrations where we obtain the parameters used in each round of
calibrations from a pre-dened distribution function for each parameter.17 While some of
the parameters were chosen relying on literature estimates, others were chosen in order
to match some outcomes of Latin American countries such as informality rates and tax
collection as a percentage of GDP. Table 1 presents the mean value (and support) of the
parameters used in the calibration excersise.
[INSERT Table 1 here]
Table 2 presents the results of the calibration of the model under the rst-best (second
column) and the second-best (third column). In particular, this table presents the mean
calibrated value for the endogenous variables of the model as well as its 95% condence
interval (presented in parenthesis).
[INSERT Table 2 here]
According to the results presented in Table 2, formal labor accounts for about 63% in
the rst-best and 59% in the second-best. The provision of the public good accounts for
about 4.5% of this economy total production (yf + yi) in the rst-best and 4.3% in the
second-best, while enforcement accounts for 0.04% in the rst-best and 0.06% in the second
best. According to the calibration results, the probability that an informal rm is detected
is about 7.2% in the rst-best and 8.7% in the second-best. These calibration results
are aimed at showing that the calibration of the model in a baseline scenario reproduces
plausible results.
A perhaps more interesting dimension to exploit with the calibration results is to under-
take simulation exercises, where we exogenously change a parameter of interest and recover
the change in the endogenous variables of the model. More precisely, we are interested in
doing simulations with respect to , the shadow cost of public funds. The results of these
simulations are presented in Figure 1. The panels in Figure 1 show how the endogenous
variables of the model change as the shadow cost of public funds,  increases in the range
from 0.2 to 0.6. In particular, the panels in Figure 1 show a negative relation between
the shadow cost of public funds and expected income (panel A); the optimal tax rate (B);
the size of the formal sector, as captured both by lf (C); the provision of the public good
17We use the F-Solve routine in Matlab in order to calibrate the model. We use uniform distributions
as the underlying distribution behind each of the parameters of the model.
(F); total government expenditures, b + e (G); and total production (D). Also, panels D
and E depict a positive relationship between the size of tax distortions and the size of the
informal sector, and the optimal level of enforcement, respectively. Finally, the message to
take away is that higher values of the shadow cost of public funds require more stick (more
enforcement) and less carrot (public goods).
4. Concluding remarks
This paper develops a model where the size of the informal sector is endogenously deter-
mined by the interaction of a representative individual and the government. On the one
hand, the representative individual has to decide the allocation of time between the formal
and the informal sectors. While in the formal sector the individual can make use of a public
good provided by the government but has to pay taxes with probability one, in the informal
sector the individual only pays taxes with an endogenously determined probability (which
is lower than one) but cannot benet from the use of the government-provided good in
production. The government, on the other hand, has to decide the allocation of resources
(collected through the tax system and nes imposedon those informal rms that are deter-
cted) between enforcement activities to detect and penalize informal activities (the sticks)
and the provision of a public (club) good that can only be used in the formal sector. We
make special emphasis on the role of tax distortions (the shadow cost of public funds) in the
determination of the size of the informal sector, the optimal tax rate and total production,
among other endogenous variables.
We make use of calibrations and simulations of the model using plausible parameter
values in order to disentangle the relationship between the size of tax distortions and other
endogenous variables of the model. In particular, our results point out a negative relation-
ship between the shadow cost of public funds and the optimal tax rate. Consequently, the
higher is the shadow of public funds, the lower are the size of the formal sector, the provi-
sion of the public good and the total government expenditure. Our results also exhibit a
positive relationship between the size of tax distortions and the size of the informal sector.
When tax distortions increase, it is optimal to reduce the amount of public good in order
to spend in enforcement.
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5. Appendix
5.1. Proof of Lemma 3
Consider the following function:
	 (e; b; lf ; ) =
@f(:)
@l^f (:)
  @g(:)
@l^f (:)
  
1  
 
@p(:)
@l^f (:)
g(li) +
@g(:)
@l^f (:)
p(e; li)
!
:
At the rst-best, we have 	
 
e; b; lf ; 

= 0. Moreover, we have:8<:
@f(L lf ;b)
@b
= 1
1  ;
g(L  lf ) = 1  1@p(e;L lf)
@e
:
The second-best is characterized by:8><>:
@f(L l^f ;b)
@b
= 1
1   	

e; b; l^f ; 

@l^f (:)
@b
;
g(L  l^f ) =


1   	

e; b; l^f ; 

@l^f (:)
@e

1
@p(e;L l^f)
@e
:
Therefore, we obtain that
g(L  l^f )  g(L  lf ) =
 

1    	

e; b; l^f ; 
 @l^f (:)
@e
!
1
@p(e;L l^f)
@e
 
0@ 
1  
1
@p(e;L lf)
@e
1A
=

1  
0@ 1
@p(e;L l^f)
@e
  1
@p(e;L lf)
@e
1A
 	

e; b; l^f ; 
 @l^f (:)
@e
1
@p(e;L l^f)
@e
:
We have
g(L  l^f )  g(L  lf )
,
1
@p(e;L l^f)
@e
  1
@p(e;L lf)
@e
 	

e; b; l^f ; 
 @l^f (:)
@e
1
@p(e;L l^f)
@e
It implies that
1
@p(e;L l^f)
@e
 1
@p(e;L lf)
@e
:
According to that @2p=@e@li > 0, we have e  e.
The same reasoning applies for the public spending. Q.E.D.
5.2. Calibration of the model
5.2.1. Functional Forms
In this appendix we describe the functional forms as well as the equations that we use to
calibrate the model.
The functional forms that we use to calibrate the model are:18
f (lf ; b) = l

f b
 ; g(li) = li; p(e; li) = e
li (A1)
5.2.2. First-Best
The solution in this case is described in Proposition 2. When we combine the optimality
conditions from Proposition 2 with the functional forms in ??, we obtain the following four
equations that are used to calibrate the model under the rst-best allocation:
l 1f b
    =


1  

2eli (A9)
 lafb
  1 =

1
1  

(A10)
e 1l2i =
1

(A11)
18It is straigtforward to show that these functional forms satisfy all assumptions made throughout the
paper.
1 = lf + li (A12)
5.2.3. Second-Best
As it is explained in section 3.3.1, the households reaction functions arise from the implicit
function 
(lf ; b; e); which, using the functional forms in ?? becomes:

(lf ; b; e) = (1  )l 1f b    + 2e(1  lf ) (A13)
The reaction functions from equations (11) and (12) become:
@l^f (:)
@b
=
 (1  ) l 1f b  1
(1  )(  1)l 2f b   2e
(A14)
@l^f (:)
@e
=
 2e 1(1  lf )
(1  )(  1)l 2f b   2e
(A15)
The equations that we use to calibrate the solution under the second-best allocation
are:
   2eli = (1  )l 1f b (A16)
1 = lf + li
1
1      l

f b
  1 =
@l^f (:)
@b

l 1f b
      2e
li
1  

(A17)
e 1l2i   1
1   =  
@l^f (:)
@e

l 1f b
      2e
li
1  

; (A18)
where the terms @l^f (:)=@b and@l^f (:)=@e are obtained from equations ?? and ?? respec-
tively.
Table 1: Parameter Values and Underlying Support
Parameter Mean Support
 0.6 [0.575, 0.625]
 0.2 [0.175, 0.225]
 0.5 [0.49, 0.51]
 0.1 [0.09, 0.11]
 0.25 [0.225, 0.275]
 0.4 [0.35, 0.45]
Table 2: Calibration Results and Conf. Intervals
Variable Second Best First Best
b 0.0317 0.0323
[0.0268, 0.0366] [0.0268, 0.0379]
e 0.0004307 0.000276
[0.0003104, 0.0005509] [0.00002131, 0.0005307]
lf 0.59 0.63
[0.51, 0.67] [0.51, 0.76]
li 0.41 0.37
[0.33, 0.49] [0.24, 0.49]
p(e; li) 0.0873 0.0717
[0.0636, 0.111] [0.0288, 0.115]
yf 0.52 0.54
[0.46, 0.57] [0.46, 0.62]
yi 0.21 0.18
[0.17, 0.25] [0.12, 0.25]
b+ e 0.0321 0.0326
[0.0273, 0.037] [0.0272, 0.038]
li=(lf + li) 0.41 0.367
[0.334, 0.486] [0.242, 0.491]
yi=(yf + yi) 0.285 0.254
[0.224, 0.345] [0.161, 0.348]


